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The interests of users of ﬁnancial statements are, in theory, paramount to accounting
standard-setters. However, there is a dearth of research into users’ participation in, and
inﬂuence on, the process of setting accounting standards. The enhanced status now
accorded to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) offers the opportunity to
examine these issues in a new regulatory context. This study reports the results of
a questionnaire survey of the perceptions of, and participation in, the IASB process of
a sample of UK investment management ﬁrms. The ﬁndings suggest that these ﬁrms’
participation is not as low as is often inferred from the public record of comment letters. In
particular, a considerable number of ﬁrms participate through representative report user
organisations such as the Investment Management Association. Other ﬁndings suggest
that the major factor inhibiting investment ﬁrms from participating is the cost of lobbying,
not complacency that the IASB is ‘on their side’ and will naturally safeguard their interests.
Moreover, the respondents consider the accounting profession and the European and US
accounting standard-setters to be the dominant interest groups in the IASB standard-
setting process.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In 2001 the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) restructured itself into the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB).1 Since the adoption of the International Accounting Standards (IAS) regulation by the European
Commission and the convergence agreement with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the IASB has grown in
importance and has, arguably, acquired the status of a private standard-setter whose activities are of primary interest to
a global audience (Jorissen, Lybaert, & Van de Poel, 2006). Its standards are developed through lengthy public consultation
procedures which may include the undertaking of ﬁeld tests, invitations to comment on exposure drafts, public round-table
meetings and public hearings. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), standard-setting of this type is a political process
in which interest groups lobby to effect wealth transfers.
Although a considerable number of studies have dealt with the lobbying activities of various interest groups in national
private sector standard-setting processes, only a very limited number have examined the lobbying pressures that the IASB
is subjected to (e.g., Zeff, 2002). Moreover, the overwhelming majority of past studies, irrespective of their regulatory
context, have focused on the preparers of ﬁnancial statements (e.g., Francis, 1987; Georgiou, 2004; Larson, 1997;
MacArthur, 1988; Schalow, 1995). Investigations of the lobbying activities of audit ﬁrms (e.g., Deegan, Morris, & Stokes,
1990; Meier, Alam, & Pearson, 1993; Puro, 1984) have been less extensive; and only a small number of studies havef the IASC.
. All rights reserved.
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setters often justify the adoption of their standards by appealing to ﬁnancial statement users’ interests. In her analysis of
the FASB’s standard-setting process, Young (2003, p. 629) argues that such appeals are merely used as a rhetorical device by
the FASB:Users of ﬁnancial statements are shadowy ﬁgures within the paragraphs of ﬁnancial accounting standards. They haunt
these texts, lurking off-page, until the FASB claims to speak for them. Then, they are ushered brieﬂy onto the page to
serve as an additional justiﬁcation for changing existing accounting requirements. Even though users are rarely pre-
sented as actively seeking information or as being consulted by the FASB, they act as another source of authority for the
FASB in its standard-setting process.The degree to which such criticisms are justiﬁed largely depends on the extent to which users of ﬁnancial statements
participate in the standard-setting process and the amount of inﬂuence they exert. As indicated above, only a few studies have
dealt with this issue in general; and an even smaller number have been undertaken within the speciﬁc context of the IASB’s
process. The purpose of this study is to ﬁll this gap in the literature. Speciﬁcally, it reports the results of a questionnaire survey
relating to the nature and volume of participation of a sample of UK investment management ﬁrms in the IASB standard-
setting process over the period 2001 to June 2006 inclusive. In addition, it reports evidence of the investment ﬁrms’
perceptions of the inﬂuence that different interest groups exert on the IASB’s decision making process.
Therefore, the study makes a contribution to the literature in three mainways. First, it provides evidence of the lobbying
activities and perceptions of ﬁnancial statement users, who have previously been largely neglected. Second, it examines
these issues in the context of the IASB, whose importance cannot be overstated. Third, it bases its ﬁndings on information
gathered on various participation methods; such information is not always publicly available. In a similar way to Georgiou
(2004) and Tandy and Wilburn (1996), the study obtains evidence directly from potential participants in the standard-
setting process.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on ﬁnancial statement users’ lobbying of accounting
standard-setting bodies; Section 3 develops the study’s hypotheses; Section 4 discusses the research design; Section 5 reports
the study’s ﬁndings; and Section 6 summarises the results and draws the conclusions.
2. Literature review
Prior literature on the lobbying activities of ﬁnancial statement users can be grouped into studies relating to national
accounting standard-setters and those relating to the IASC/IASB. In the context of the US regulatory environment, Tandy and
Wilburn (1992) reported that, out of a total of 13,369 comment letters received by FASB in relation to the adoption of its ﬁrst
100 accounting standards, only 239 (185 from individuals and 54 from representative organisations) were submitted by
report users. More recently Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009) investigated lobbying in relation to the passage
of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. They reported that, out of a total number of 1,948 letters which they analysed, 125 (6.4%)
were from investor groups. This is not a negligible number but it is substantially lower than the number of letters submitted
by preparers, 629 (32.2%).
In the context of the UK’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB) process, Weetman, Davie, and Collins (1996) investigated
lobbying on the issue of the Operating and Financial Review (ASB, 1993). They reported that, out of a total of 104 comment
letters, 14 were submitted by report user groups. In addition to the examination of comment letters, the authors undertook
interviews with 20 ﬁnancial statement users, partly in order to establish the reasons why they had not made written
submissions. They noted that only one respondent was able to articulate a clear reason for not writing: that analysts do not
expect to be inﬂuential in the lobbying process, since it is the preparers of accounts who hold the key to consensus. Others
offered reasons such as a tradition of not responding in writing, a statement that ﬁtted with the authors’ observation that
there were ‘indications that the analysts were encountering ASB representatives at informal meetings where they felt they
could express their views on current issues’.
Van Lent (1997) investigated the lobbying activities of various interest groups, including those of report users, in the
promulgation of Dutch ﬁnancial reporting regulations for companies engaging in banking and insurance activities. The author
documented that lobbying by most report users was not intensive, but he also noted the substantial resources devoted to
lobbying by the ﬁnancial press and a large investment ﬁrm which managed to have an important inﬂuence on the resulting
accounting standard.
Using Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory, Hardy’s (1994) power framework and Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy typology,
Durocher, Fortin, and Coˆte´ (2007) developed an integrative explanatorymodel of user participation in the Canadian standard-
setting process. The authors undertook interviews with 27 Canadian report users and their ﬁndings, which were used to
reﬁne their model, supported their expectations. For example, they reported that a perception by users, that it was the task of
accountants to set accounting standards, affected the cognitive legitimacy granted by users, which in turn negatively affected
their participation in the process (Durocher et al., 2007, p. 53).
There are also a number of studies which relate to the IASC period. Kenny and Larson (1993), in their examination of the
submissions made to the IASC on the issue of Joint Ventures, listed only two report user organisations: the Security Analysts
Association of Japan and the US Association of Investment Management Research (AIMR). Kenny and Larson (1995) also
reported a low level of user participation in their examination of submissions relating to 14 exposure drafts that the IASC
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organisations (submitted by 5 different respondents). In contrast, in their examination of the history of the IASC, Zeff and
Camfferman (2007) reported that ﬁnancial analysts ‘were very active in board discussions, and considerable attention was
paid to their views’ (page 220).
Finally, two recent studies relate to the IASB period. Jorissen et al. (2006) reported that, between 2002 and the summer of
2005, the IASB received just 30 letters from report users, which represents only 1% of the 2,245 letters they received during
this period. Larson (2007) examined participation in the due process followed by the IASB’s Interpretations and Financial
Reporting Committee (IFRIC). He examined the comment letters written to IFRIC in relation to its ﬁrst 18 Draft Interpretations.
Consistent with other studies, Larson (2007) reported a low level of participation by report users. Out of a total of 714
comment letters received, only 34 (5%) were from report users (submitted by 26 different respondents).
In summary, the literature review highlights the dearth of empirical evidence on ﬁnancial statement users’ involvement in
accounting standard-setting. Only a few studies have measured user participation, or investigated the reasons for the
seemingly low level of this.
3. Development of hypotheses
A theoretical framework used by a considerable number of studies to explain participation in the standard-setting process
is that of Sutton (1984). This is based on the theory of economic democracy (Downs,1957), and it is within this framework that
this study has been undertaken.2 Sutton (1984) developed a rational choicemodel which suggests that a partywill lobby if the
beneﬁts of lobbying, adjusted by the probability that lobbying will make a difference to the outcome, exceed the cost of
lobbying.3.1. Timing of lobbying
Sutton (1984) suggests that the probability of making a difference to the outcome of the process increases if lobbying is
undertaken at the early stages of the process. The IASB process is similar to those followed by other private standard-setters
(e.g., the FASB). During the period of study 2001 to June 2006, it consisted – as it still does – of six identiﬁable stages during
which an interested party can lobby before the adoption of an IFRS (IASCF, 2005, 2006).3
1. Agenda formation stage. The IASB deliberates whether or not it should add a topic to its agenda. A simple majority of IASB
members voting in favour is sufﬁcient for the topic to be admitted to the agenda.
2. Drafting and adoption of a discussion paper. A project director, who may be aided by an advisory group, undertakes the
drafting of a discussion paper. Approval of the discussion paper is subject to the same voting rules as is the addition of
a topic to the agenda.
3. Exposure period of a discussion paper. The discussion paper is published and comments are formally invited from any
interested party.
4. Drafting and adoption of an exposure draft. The comment letters submitted on the discussion paper, and all other input
received, e.g., evidence given at public hearings or round-table meetings which the IASB may have decided to hold, are
used in the drafting of the exposure draft. For the exposure draft to be approved, nine IASBmember votes are required (was
eight member votes up to July 2005 (IASCF, 2005)).
5. Exposure period of an exposure draft. The exposure draft is published for public comment.
6. Drafting and adoption of an IFRS. The analysis of comments and any other input received are used in the drafting of an IFRS,
which is approved if nine IASB members vote in its favour (was eight member votes up to July 2005 (IASCF, 2005)).
It is important to note that the publication of a discussion paper (stages 2 and 3) is not mandatory and, instead, the IASB
may proceed with the development of an exposure draft, which is mandatory. According to Georgiou (2004), who examined
the ASB process, which is similar to that of the IASB, the ﬁrst three of the above stages (agenda stage; drafting of a discussion
paper; and publication of a discussion paper) can be categorised as ‘early’ stages, and the last three (drafting of an exposure
draft; publication of an exposure draft; and drafting of an IFRS) as the ‘late’ stages, of the process.
Given Sutton’s prediction that lobbying early in the process is more effective than lobbying at a late stage, it is expected
that a greater number of ﬁrms will lobby at the early stages of the IASB process. This leads to the ﬁrst hypothesis, stated in its
null form:
H1 : There is no difference between the number of investment ﬁrms which lobby at the early and the late stages of the IASB
standard-setting process.2 An alternative framework, which is not adopted by this study, does not consider the standard-setting process to be pluralistic and focuses on the
broader social context in which private regulatory organisations such as the IASB exist (Georgiou, 2002; Sikka, 2001).
3 The IASB has subsequently made some changes to its due process (IASCF, 2008). The process described here is the one in effect during the study period.
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Sutton (1984) also predicts that the probability of making a difference to the outcome of the process is likely to lead
potential lobbyists to use several lobbying methods. Although the literature review showed that the level of report user
lobbying in the form of comment letters is low, it is possible that ﬁrms are participating in the IASB process using an array of
other lobbying methods. Sutton (1984) categorises lobbying methods as either direct, where lobbyists directly communicate
with the standard-setter or indirect, where lobbyists make their approach via a third party. In the context of the IASB process,
direct methods include: (a) Submitting comment letters in response to IASB’s invitations to comment; (b) Speaking at IASB
public hearings; (c) Participating in IASB public round-table meetings; (d) Participating in ﬁeld visits and/or ﬁeld tests; (e)
Communicating with IASB members or technical staff in pre-arranged private meetings or by other means (e.g., telephone
conversation); (f) Having employees working as members of advisory/working groups set up by the IASB for particular
projects. Indirect methods include: (a) Commenting in the media; (b) Appeals to UK government and/or European
Commission ofﬁcials; (c) Appeals to themembers or technical staff of the ASB or of the European Financial Reporting Advisory
Group (EFRAG); (d) Appeals to the ﬁrm’s trade association(s) (such as the Investment Management Association (IMA)) and/or
participating in the preparation of its response; and (e) Sponsoring research studies.
In the context of the ASB process, Georgiou (2004) reported that preparers used a variety of lobbying methods and that
their usewas signiﬁcantly associatedwith the use of comment letters;moreover thesemethodswere not perceived as equally
effective. Hence the following two hypotheses in their null form:
H2 : The use of comment letters is not related to the use of other lobbying methods.
H3 : Investment ﬁrms perceive the various lobbying methods as equally effective.3.3. The decision not to participate
As stated above, a party will consider the potential beneﬁts, the cost, and the probability of success when deciding
whether or not to lobby. Sutton (1984) predicts that report users are much less likely to lobby than preparers of ﬁnancial
statements. They have less to gain from lobbying: they draw income from a diversiﬁed portfolio of investments and
consequently the effects of a change in accounting standards are not as important to them as they are to preparers of ﬁnancial
statements, who draw income from only a few sources. Furthermore, the beneﬁt of successful lobbying for ﬁnancial statement
users is to achieve more transparent and relevant information for decision making. The provision of this information is
unlikely to have an immediate impact on their cash ﬂow, and consequently its beneﬁt is difﬁcult and costly to measure. In
addition, preparers are likely to be wealthier and therefore will be better able to afford the cost of lobbying. Sutton (1984, p.
86) also argues that because the economic interests of preparers are more homogeneous, it is easier for them to create
temporary organisations for lobbying purposes and consequently reduce the cost of lobbying. The third factor relevant to the
lobbying decision calculus is the probability that lobbying will make a difference to the outcome of the process. As one analyst
indicated to Weetman et al. (1996), this was the most important factor in report users’ decisions not to make written
submissions.
Therefore all three factors, beneﬁts, costs, and probability of success, can be of vital importance in the decision not to lobby.
Hence, the following hypothesis in its null form:
H4 : Investment ﬁrms consider the beneﬁts, costs, and probability of success as equally important in their decision not to
participate in the IASB standard-setting process.3.4. Perceived inﬂuence of interest groups
The standard-setting environment in which the IASB operates is considerably more complex than that of national
accounting standard-setters, as more groups have a direct interest in its activities. For example, the FASB has entered into
a convergence agreement with the IASB. In addition to ﬁnancial statement users, the following groups are potentially
interested and inﬂuential in the IASB standard-setting process: i) preparers of ﬁnancial statements; ii) auditing ﬁrms; iii)
professional accountancy bodies; iv) European accounting standard-setters and the EFRAG; v) the FASB; vi) the US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC); vii) European Governments and the European Commission; and viii) academics.
The various parties interested in accounting standards may not be equally inﬂuential in the standard-setting process
(Walker & Robinson, 1993). For example, Kwok and Sharp (2005) reported that preparers were more inﬂuential in the
development of two IASC standards than other interest groups. Moreover, parties will have perceptions of the inﬂuence that
different interest groups exert in the accounting standard-setting process which may or may not match reality. These
perceptions are important, and could inﬂuence the level of participation in the process. For example, a perception that the
process is controlled by the preparers of ﬁnancial statements may lead to non-participation by ﬁnancial statement users.
Given that report users are the target beneﬁciaries of the IASB standards, and given their allegedly low level of participation in
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Hence the following hypothesis in its null form:
H5 : Investment ﬁrms perceive the various interest groups as equally inﬂuential in the IASB standard-setting process.4. Research design
4.1. Questionnaire survey
In order to test the above hypotheses, the questionnaire by Georgiou (2004) was adapted for the IASB process and the
targeted subjects (see Appendix). In the development of the questionnaire, standard questionnaire procedures were followed
which included interviews with a senior member of staff of the IMA and a Director of the London Investment Banking
Association; interviews with one Edinburgh-based and one London-based investment manager; pre-testing and a pilot
questionnaire.
Questions 1 and 2 of the questionnaire relate to the ﬁrst three hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3), which are concerned with the
extent and nature of report user lobbying and the perceived effectiveness of this lobbying.
Question 3 relates to hypothesis H4, which is concerned with the factors that inﬂuence the decision of investment
management ﬁrms not to participate in the IASB process. Firms were requested to rate six factors using a 1–5 Likert scale.
These factors were drawn from Sutton’s (1984) model which considers: the potential beneﬁts of lobbying; the probability of
its success; and the cost of lobbying. With respect to a potential lack of beneﬁts from lobbying, ﬁrms were requested to rate
the following factor:
(i) Lack of impact of the proposed changes on the ability of your ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial analysts to analyse company ﬁnancial
statements.
According to Sutton (1984), even though there may be potential beneﬁts from participation, ﬁrms may not participate
because they may believe that their participationwill not make a difference to the outcome of the process. Firms may believe
that the IASB will not respond positively to users’ views (Weetman et al., 1996). Hence ﬁrms were requested to rate the
following factor:
(ii) The belief that the IASB would not have responded positively to your ﬁrm’s views.
Alternatively, users of ﬁnancial statements may trust the IASB to protect their interests and, therefore, may believe that it
will, irrespective of their participation, adopt their preferred position. Hence investment ﬁrms were requested to rate the
following factor:
(iii) The belief that the IASB would in any case have adopted your ﬁrm’s preferred position.
Finally, they may decide not to participate, not because they consider a negative or a positive outcome as a fait accompli,
but because they are aware that their views will be represented by others and that their participation, one more voice, would
not make a difference. Hence ﬁrms were requested to rate the following factor:
(iv) The belief that your ﬁrm’s views were adequately represented by other investment industry representatives.
With respect to the cost of lobbying, ﬁrms were explicitly asked to rate its importance:
(v) The cost (including time) of participating in the IASB standard-setting process.
Firms were also requested to indicate whether lack of sufﬁcient expertise to identify the impact of the proposed changes
was an important reason for not participating. As previously discussed, the measurement of the potential beneﬁts to users
from lobbying is difﬁcult and costly. Therefore, obtaining expertise to identify these beneﬁts is part of the cost that a ﬁrm
needs to incur in order to participate in the process. Hence ﬁrms were requested to rate the following factor:
(vi) Lack of sufﬁcient expertise to identify the impact of the proposed changes.
Question 4 relates to hypothesis H5, which is concernedwith investment ﬁrms’ perceptions of the inﬂuence that a number
of interest groups exert on the IASB process. Firms were requested to assess the inﬂuence of eight interest groups as outlined
in Section 3.4 above, and three report user groups: institutional investors; investment management ﬁrms; and stockbrokers,
using a 1–5 Likert scale.
Table 1
Lobbying at different stages of the process.
Stage of the process Users no. Non-users no. % of respondents
using this stage
(no. of users/n)
Agenda formation stage (n¼ 69) 7 62 10
Drafting stage of discussion paper (n¼ 69) 9 60 13
Exposure period of discussion paper (n¼ 69) 14 55 20
Drafting stage of exposure draft (n¼ 69) 9 60 13
Exposure period of exposure draft (n¼ 69) 20 49 29
Drafting stage of IFRS (n¼ 69) 9 60 13
n: number of ﬁrms responding to this item.
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The population of the study consisted of 312 investment management ﬁrms. These were drawn from two sources. First,
ﬁrms which manage UK funds listed on the London Stock Exchange (Financial Express, 2006). This source yielded 178 ﬁrms.
Second, ﬁrms included in the list of Investment Managers & Advisers (NAPF, 2006). This provided an additional 134
investment ﬁrms, resulting in a total of 312 ﬁrms.
The questionnaire was dispatched during June 2006 and the covering letter was addressed by name to either the Chief
Investment Ofﬁcer, Head of Research, or Investment Director, of each organisation. It elicited 69 usable responses, giving
a 22.1% response rate. This compares very favourably with response rates for similar research. For example, Beattie, Goodacre,
and Thomson (2006) reported a response rate of 9% from users of ﬁnancial statements to a survey of their attitudes towards
lease accounting. It can also be considered as healthy given the poor response by users to invitations to comment on IASB
proposals. Evidence on non-response bias was obtained by examining differences between the responses of early and late
respondents. The comparisons indicated that there were no signiﬁcant differences between the two groups in terms of their
responses to the four questions included in the questionnaire.
The questionnaires were answered by senior managers holding positions such as Investment Director, Head of Equity
Research, and Head of Accounting Valuation. All respondents held either an academic and/or a professional qualiﬁcation such
as Chartered Financial Analyst. In order to obtain ameasure of the responses’ reliability, interviews (lasting between forty-ﬁve
minutes and one hour each) with four randomly selected respondents were conducted approximately six months after the
questionnaires were received. No inconsistencies were found between the questionnaire responses and the interview
ﬁndings.5. Results and discussion
5.1. Timing of lobbying
Table 1 reports the results of the survey with respect to the use of the six stages of the IASB standard-setting process
identiﬁed in Question 1. The ﬁrst three stages (agenda, drafting of discussion paper and exposure of discussion paper) were
considered as the early stages, and the last three (drafting of exposure draft, exposure of exposure draft and drafting of the
IFRS) as the late stages. For both early and late stages, each companywas given a scorewhich ranged from 0 to 3 (i.e., 0 given if
no stage was used; 1 if one stage was used; 2 if two stages were used and 3 if three stages were used). In order to test H1 that
there is no statistical difference between the number of ﬁrms which used early and late stages, a paired-samples t-test and
a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test were undertaken. Both tests indicated that the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected (t¼1.473, p¼ 0.145 and Z¼1.417, p¼ 0.156).4
An examination of Table 1 indicates that the early stages were actually used by fewer respondents than the late stages
(e.g., 14 ﬁrms lobbied at the exposure period of the discussion paper, as opposed to 20 at the exposure period of the
exposure draft). These ﬁndings, however, need to be put into context. As previously pointed out, the discussion paper
stage is not mandatory. Between 2001 and the time when the questionnaire was dispatched, in June 2006, the IASB
published for comment 28 exposure drafts and four discussion papers.5 Therefore, the lower number of observations at
the early stages of the process (which include the discussion paper stage) is likely to be due to the fact that there were
fewer documents to comment on. This, though, could not have been a reason for Georgiou’s (2004) similar results, as that
study related to the 1991–1996 period, during which, out of the 40 documents that ASB published,6 22 were discussion
papers.4 All tests reported in the paper were two-tailed.
5 These numbers do not include documents published by IFRIC. The IASC issues paper, Extractive Industries, which was published on 30 November 2000,
is included in the four discussion papers because its comment period ended on 30 June 2001 (three months after the IASB took over from IASC).
6 This excludes four proposals which were not relevant to that study’s sample of respondents, e.g., proposals for insurance companies.
Table 2
Effectiveness of stages.
1 Very
effective
%
2 Effective
%
3 Neither effective
nor ineffective
%
4 Ineffective
%
5 Very ineffective
%
Mean of
Likert score
SD of Likert
score
Agenda formation stage
(n¼ 27), (DK¼ 42)
19 37 19 11 15 2.67 1.33
Drafting stage of discussion
paper (n¼ 30), (DK¼ 39)
13 33 33 3 17 2.77 1.25
Exposure period of discussion
paper (n¼ 32), (DK¼ 37)
3 47 28 13 9 2.78 1.04
Drafting stage of exposure
draft (n¼ 31), (DK¼ 38)
3 26 45 13 13 3.06 1.03
Exposure period of exposure
draft (n¼ 33), (DK¼ 36)
3 42 30 15 9 2.85 1.03
Drafting stage of IFRS (n¼ 31),
(DK¼ 38)
3 48 23 16 10 2.81 1.08
n: number of respondents that gave a rating; DK: number of respondents that chose the ‘Do Not Know’ option.
G. Georgiou / The British Accounting Review 42 (2010) 103–118 109Nor do ﬁndings which are not affected by the number of discussion papers and exposure drafts published support Sutton’s
(1984) expectation that ﬁrms aremore likely to engage in early lobbying. It is noteworthy that the earliest stage of the process,
the agenda stage, was actually the stage which was used by the least number of ﬁrms (only seven). Moreover, the exposure
period of the exposure draft was more popular than the drafting stage which precedes it (20 ﬁrms used the former; 9 the
latter). The same applies to the discussion paper stage (14 ﬁrms lobbied during the exposure period but only 9 at its drafting
stage). These results mirror those of Georgiou (2004), i.e., the stages at which public consultation is sought have been used by
a substantially greater number of ﬁrms than the other stages, during which consultation is less overt. Therefore, it appears
that either the IASB does not provide more participation opportunities outside its public consultation stages to report users
than those given by the ASB to preparers; or, if it does, these are not taken up by report users.
Table 2 summarises the ratings given by the respondents to the effectiveness of lobbying at each of the six stages. Here,
two observations can be made. First, the majority of respondents did not give a rating, but instead chose the ‘Do not know’
option. Further analysis revealed that most of these ﬁrms did not lobby at these stages. Second, there does not seem to be
a difference in terms of the perceived effectiveness of the six stages. A one-way within subjects (repeated measures) ANOVA
indicated that the stages were not considered to be signiﬁcantly different in terms of their effectiveness (F2.775, 63.819¼1.116,
p> 0.05). A non-parametric test involving the Friedman test produced a similar result, c2¼ 8.896, p> 0.05.
Further Mann–Whitney tests, presented in Table 3, indicated that users (ﬁrms which indicated that they used the stages)
and non-users (ﬁrms which did not) did not have signiﬁcantly different perceptions concerning the effectiveness of the
various stages.7 These results are different from those of Georgiou (2004), who reported that preparers who lobbied did in
general consider lobbying to be more effective than preparers who did not. Therefore, it does appear that, in the case of
ﬁnancial statement users, lobbying experience does not help them form more positive perceptions of the potential effec-
tiveness of their lobbying.
In summary, the perceptions of most respondents do not appear to match Sutton’s (1984) suggestion that lobbying at the
early stages of the process is more effective than lobbying at its late stages. On the other hand, as the additional comments of
one of the respondents indicate, a few respondents are well aware of the importance of engaging early in the process:7 Onl
parame
8 The
ManageWe believe that the period when the greatest level of inﬂuence can be exerted during the process of development of
IFRSs is prior to the IASB issuing exposure drafts or discussion papers.5.2. Methods of lobbying
Table 4 reports the results relating to the use of 14 lobbying methods identiﬁed in Question 2 of the questionnaire. Three
main conclusions can be drawn. First, consistent with the predictions of Sutton (1984), lobbying activity is not restricted to the
use of comment letters. However, only a minority of respondents used the methods identiﬁed in the question. None of the
methods were used by more than a third of the respondents, and some methods were used by a very small number of ﬁrms
(e.g., only 4 ﬁrms indicated that they appealed to the UK government/European Commission).
Second, the most popular method, used by 23 ﬁrms, was to appeal to a trade organisation, such as the IMA.8 An expla-
nation for this ﬁnding may lie in the proactive stance that the management of the IMA, which appears to be heavily engagedy non-parametric results are reported given the type of data (ordinal) involved, the relatively small sample and the normality assumptions that
tric tests require. In any case, the results of the parametric t-tests were remarkably similar to those reported.
IMA is a relatively young organisation, formed in 2002 from the merger of the Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds and the Fund
rs Association.
Table 3
Comparison of users’ and non-users’ perceptions of the effectiveness of stages.
Stage of the process Users no. Users mean SD Non-users no. Non-users mean SD Mann–Whitney
Z p
Agenda formation
stage (n¼ 27)
6 2.50 1.52 21 2.71 1.31 0.362 0.755
Drafting stage
of discussion paper (n¼ 30)
9 2.33 1.22 21 2.95 1.24 1.392 0.193
Exposure period
of discussion paper (n¼ 32)
13 2.38 0.77 19 3.05 1.13 1.602 0.136
Drafting stage
of exposure draft (n¼ 31)
9 2.78 1.20 22 3.18 0.96 1.016 0.309
Exposure period
of exposure draft (n¼ 33)
17 2.82 1.18 16 2.88 0.88 0.400 0.709
Drafting stage
of IFRS (n¼ 31)
9 2.78 1.09 22 2.82 1.10 0.140 0.915
n: number of ﬁrms responding to this item.
G. Georgiou / The British Accounting Review 42 (2010) 103–118110with the IASB, has taken in the IASB process. For example, in 2006 the IMA submitted ﬁve comment letters to the IASB and
also used press releases to publicise its stance on various issues.9 Moreover, an interview with a senior IMA staff member,
during the development of the questionnaire instrument, revealed that the Association’s engagement with the IASB goes
beyond the submission of comment letters and involves other types of direct contact. One of the respondents showed
complete awareness of these contacts and, in the additional comments, stressed the reliance they place on the IMA to
promote their interests:9 See.We have spoken to the IMA as a representative of the fundmanagement industry. The IMA has started having regular
dialogue with the IASB. The aim of this dialogue is to ensure that fund managers, as the users of accounts on behalf of
their clients, are able to have some inﬂuence on the standard-setting process.Another explanation for this relatively high level of indirect lobbying may lie in the education and professional experience
of investment managers. In comparison to some other groups such as preparers and accountants, investment managers may
possess less technical accounting expertise (Durocher et al., 2007) – an expertise which direct participation is likely to require
– and consequently they may ﬁnd it less costly to participate indirectly. This explanation is also consistent with the relatively
high number of ﬁrms that used comment in the media (16%). Van Lent (1997, p. 24) also reported that, apart from one large
investment ﬁrm, users of ﬁnancial statements conﬁned their lobbying activity to indirect means such as conveying their
views to newspapers. In contrast, Georgiou (2004), in his examination of the lobbying activities of preparers of ﬁnancial
statements, reported a substantial use of direct methods (e.g., 25% communicated their views to ASB members in pre-
arranged private meetings).
Third, the submission of comment letters was found to be the second most popular method, used by 14 investment ﬁrms
(20%). Cross tabulation revealed that these 14 ﬁrms were likely to also engage in other forms of lobbying. A number of Chi-
square based measures of association indicated that the correlation between the submission of comment letters and the use
of other methods is signiﬁcant. For example, out of these 14 ﬁrms, 10 also made representations to a report user organisation
(Cramer’s V¼ 0.408, p< 0.001). Thus, the null hypothesis (H2), that the use of comment letters is not related to the use of
other lobbying methods, is rejected. Further analysis, however, indicated that a substantial number of ﬁrms, 17 (25%), used
other lobbying methods without using comment letters; in total, 31 ﬁrms (45%) used at least one lobbying method. Clearly,
the ﬁrms which responded to this survey are more likely to have been participants in the IASB process, and thus the study’s
ﬁndings may exaggerate the extent of lobbying by ﬁnancial statement users. Nevertheless, subject to this caveat, it does
appear that lobbying by report users is more intensive than the number of comment letters seems to suggest.
Table 5 reports the effectiveness ratings given by the respondents to each of the lobbying methods. A one-way within
subjects (repeated measures) ANOVA indicated that the respondents did not perceive the various lobbying methods to be
signiﬁcantly different in terms of their effectiveness (F6.065, 109.165¼ 0.548, p> 0.05). A Friedman test conﬁrmed this result,
c2¼ 8.892, p> 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis (H3) that respondents perceive the various lobbyingmethods to be equally
effective is not rejected.
The results show that the method rated as effective or very effective by most respondents (56%) was having employees of
the ﬁrm appointed as members of an advisory/working group set up by the IASB (eliciting a 2.53 mean score). Further paired-
samples t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed that this method was considered signiﬁcantly more effective than
indirect methods of lobbying; for example, it was considered more effective statistically at the 0.05 signiﬁcance level than
commenting in the media (t¼2.300, p¼ 0.029 and Z¼2.145, p¼ 0.032). However, it was not found to be signiﬁcantly
more effective than comment letters (t¼1.691, p¼ 0.102 and Z¼1.595, p¼ 0.111) and some other direct methods such as
pre-arranged private meetings with IASB members (t¼1.192, p¼ 0.244 and Z¼1.154, p¼ 0.248) and pre-arrangedrecent press release concerning the debate on IFRS 8 (IMA, 2007).
Table 4
Lobbying methods.
Lobbying method No. of users No. of non-users % of respondents using
this method (no. of users/n)
Direct methods
Submitting comment letters in response
to IASB’s invitations to comment (n¼ 69)
14 55 20
Speaking at IASB public hearings (n¼ 69) 2 67 3
Participating in IASB public round-table
meetings (n¼ 69)
7 62 10
Participating in ﬁeld visits and/or ﬁeld tests (n¼ 69) 6 63 9
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB members
in pre-arranged private meetings (n¼ 69)
10 59 14
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB members
through other means (e.g., telephone conversation,
meeting at conferences) (n¼ 69)
9 60 13
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB technical
staff in pre-arranged private meetings (n¼ 69)
6 63 9
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB technical
staff through other means (e.g., telephone
conversation, meeting at conferences) (n¼ 69)
8 61 12
Having employees of your ﬁrm appointed as members
to advisory/working groups set up by IASB for
particular projects (n¼ 69)
8 61 12
Indirect methods
Commenting in the media (n¼ 69) 11 58 16
Appealing to UK government and/or European Commission
ofﬁcials for support of your ﬁrm’s views (n¼ 69)
4 65 6
Appealing to the members or technical staff of the UK’s
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) or of the European
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) for support
of your ﬁrm’s views (n¼ 69)
8 61 12
Appealing to your ﬁrm’s trade association(s) (such as the
Investment Management Association) for support of your
ﬁrm’s views and/or participating in the preparation
of its response (n¼ 69)
23 46 33
Sponsoring research studies on ﬁnancial accounting
and reporting issues (n¼ 69)
2 67 3
Other (please specify) (n¼ 69) 5 64 7
n: number of ﬁrms responding to this item.
G. Georgiou / The British Accounting Review 42 (2010) 103–118 111meetings with IASB staff (t¼0.724, p¼ 0.476 and Z¼0.635, p¼ 0.526), two methods which elicited high effectiveness
ratings (means 2.69 and 2.72 respectively). One respondent in the additional comments noted:In the past we have been heavily involved with the IASB and its staff in the development of IFRSs. We believe that we
have been able to help inﬂuence the debate and subsequent development of standards.Further Mann–Whitney tests, presented in Table 6, indicated that users (ﬁrms which indicated that they used the
methods) and non-users (ﬁrms which did not) did not in general have signiﬁcantly different perceptions concerning the
effectiveness of the various lobbying methods. However, with respect to two methods, users reported signiﬁcantly different
perceptions than non-users (at the 0.05 level). These methods were the submission of comment letters, and communicating
with the UK government and European Commission ofﬁcials. In both cases, users had more positive perceptions of the
effectiveness of these methods. This provides partial support to Georgiou (2004), who reported that in general preparers who
lobbied were more likely to consider lobbying as effective.
5.3. Factors contributing to non-participation in the IASB process
Table 7 tabulates the reasons why investment management ﬁrms do not participate in the process. The results of a within
subjects ANOVA test reject the null hypothesis (H4) that the respondents perceive the six factors given in question 3 (which
relate to the beneﬁts, costs, and probability of success) as equally important (F5, 305¼ 9.969, p< 0.01). A Friedman test
produced a similar result, c2¼19.967, p< 0.01.
Two factors appear to dominate this decision. The ﬁrst is the cost (including time) of participating in the process; this
factor was rated by 61% of the respondents as important or very important. A cost that may inhibit user participation, i.e., lack
of sufﬁcient expertise, was found to be important or very important for 31% of the respondents. These are noteworthy ﬁndings
and should be contrasted with those of Georgiou (2002) that only 18% of preparers considered the cost of participation an
important or very important factor in their decision not to participate in the ASB process. Taken together, the two sets of
Table 5
Perceived effectiveness of lobbying methods.
Lobbying method 1 Very
effective
%
2 Effective
%
3 Neither effective
nor ineffective
%
4 Ineffective
%
5 Very
ineffective
%
Mean of
Likert
score
SD of
Likert
score
Direct methods
Submitting comment letters in
response to IASB’s invitations
to comment (n¼ 34), (DK¼ 35)
3 35 38 6 18 3.00 1.13
Speaking at IASB public
hearings (n¼ 28), (DK¼ 41)
0 25 50 11 14 3.14 0.97
Participating in IASB public round-
table meetings (n¼ 29), (DK¼ 40)
3 35 31 17 14 3.03 1.12
Participating in ﬁeld visits and/or
ﬁeld tests (n¼ 25), (DK¼ 44)
8 24 40 8 20 3.08 1.22
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to
IASB members in pre-arranged
private meetings (n¼ 29), (DK¼ 40)
14 38 21 21 7 2.69 1.17
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to
IASB members through other means
(e.g., telephone conversation, meeting
at conferences) (n¼ 30), (DK¼ 39)
7 20 47 17 10 3.03 1.03
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB
technical staff in pre-arranged private
meetings (n¼ 29), (DK¼ 40)
14 35 28 14 10 2.72 1.19
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB
technical staff through other means
(e.g., telephone conversation, meeting
at conferences) (n¼ 29), (DK¼ 40)
3 28 38 21 10 3.07 1.03
Having employees of your ﬁrm appointed as
members to advisory/working groups set up
by IASB for particular projects (n¼ 30),
(DK¼ 39)
13 43 27 10 7 2.53 1.07
Indirect methods
Commenting in the media (n¼ 33), (DK¼ 36) 6 18 39 21 15 3.21 1.11
Appealing to UK government and/or European
Commission ofﬁcials for support of your
ﬁrm’s views (n¼ 27), (DK¼ 42)
7 22 30 22 19 3.22 1.22
Appealing to the members or technical staff of
the UK’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB)
or of the European Financial Reporting
Advisory Group (EFRAG) for support of
your ﬁrm’s views (n¼ 28), (DK¼ 41)
0 39 39 11 11 2.93 0.98
Appealing to your ﬁrm’s trade association(s)
(such as the Investment Management
Association) for support of your ﬁrm’s views
and/or participating in the preparation of its
response (n¼ 36), (DK¼ 33)
8 22 36 22 11 3.06 1.12
Sponsoring research studies on ﬁnancial
accounting and reporting issues (n¼ 26),
(DK¼ 43)
0 23 50 8 19 3.23 1.03
n: number of ﬁrms that gave a rating; DK: number of respondents that chose the ‘Do Not Know’ option.
G. Georgiou / The British Accounting Review 42 (2010) 103–118112ﬁndings offer support to Sutton’s (1984) proposition that, in the decision on whether to lobby or not, the cost of lobbying is
a far more important factor for report users than for preparers of ﬁnancial statements.
The second factor is respondents’ belief that other investment industry representatives adequately represented their
views. This factor was rated by 54% of the respondents as important or very important. Therefore, a majority of investment
management ﬁrms essentially free ride (expect others to undertake the cost of lobbying and representing their views). This is
consistent with the ﬁndings of Durocher et al. (2007, p. 54) that 30% of the interviewees believed that it ‘was someone else’s
role to represent their interests’. It is also consistent with the above mentioned ﬁnding that the cost of participating was
considered important by most of the respondents; ceteris paribus, the higher the cost of lobbying, the more likely it is that
a party will free ride (Sutton, 1984).
There is less support for the suggestion that users are less likely to participate due to lack of potential beneﬁts. Never-
theless, this was found to be relevant for a signiﬁcant minority: 29% rated the lack of impact of the proposed changes as
important or very important. It should also be stressed that most respondents did not indicate that lack of participation was
due to a belief that the IASB would in any case adopt their preferred positions. This was the least signiﬁcant reason, eliciting
a mean score of 3.51, and was rated as important or very important by only 14% of the respondents. In fact, it appears that it
was the opposite belief, i.e., that the IASB would not respond positively to their views, that led to the non-participation of
Table 6
Comparison of users’ and non-users’ perceptions of the effectiveness of lobbying methods.
Lobbying method Users no. Users mean SD Non-users no. Non-users
mean
SD Mann–Whitney
Z p
Direct methods
Submitting comment letters in response
to IASB’s invitations to comment (n¼ 34)
14 2.57 0.94 20 3.30 1.17 2.164 0.039
Speaking at IASB public hearings (n¼ 28) 2 2.00 0.00 26 3.23 0.95 2.024 0.063
Participating in IASB public round-table
meetings (n¼ 29)
7 2.71 1.25 22 3.14 1.08 0.823 0.438
Participating in ﬁeld visits and/or
ﬁeld tests (n¼ 25)
4 2.50 1.00 21 3.19 1.25 0.775 0.496
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB
members in pre-arranged private
meetings (n¼ 29)
8 2.38 1.19 21 2.81 1.17 0.887 0.401
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB
members through other means (e.g., telephone
conversation, meeting at conferences) (n¼ 30)
7 2.57 0.98 23 3.17 1.03 1.277 0.245
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB technical
staff in pre-arranged private meetings (n¼ 29)
5 1.80 0.84 24 2.92 1.18 1.943 0.059
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB technical
staff through other means (e.g., telephone
conversation, meeting at conferences) (n¼ 29)
7 2.71 0.76 22 3.18 1.10 1.065 0.328
Having employees of your ﬁrm appointed as members
to advisory/working groups set up by IASB for
particular projects (n¼ 30)
8 2.12 1.13 22 2.68 0.83 1.065 0.320
Indirect methods
Commenting in the media (n¼ 33) 11 3.09 1.14 22 3.27 1.12 0.338 0.749
Appealing to UK government and/or European
Commission ofﬁcials for support of your
ﬁrm’s views (n¼ 27)
4 2.00 0.82 23 3.43 1.16 2.175 0.034
Appealing to the members or technical staff of the UK’s
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) or of the European
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) for
support of your ﬁrm’s views (n¼ 28)
8 2.50 0.53 20 3.10 1.07 1.303 0.237
Appealing to your ﬁrm’s trade association(s) (such as the
Investment Management Association) for support of
your ﬁrm’s views and/or participating in the preparation
of its response (n¼ 36)
22 3.09 1.19 14 3.00 1.04 0.219 0.835
Sponsoring research studies on ﬁnancial accounting
and reporting issues (n¼ 26)
2 2.00 0.00 24 3.33 1.01 2.080 0.055
n: number of ﬁrms responding to this item.
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cannot be argued that investment managers are complacent about the need to get involved in the process because they
consider the standard-setter to be ‘on their side’.5.4. Perceptions of inﬂuence
Table 8 summarises the responses that managers gave to the question on how inﬂuential in the standard-setting process
they considered 11 interest groups. Both parametric and non-parametric tests showed that the respondents considered these
groups to exert signiﬁcantly different levels of inﬂuence on the IASB: within subjects ANOVA (F5.131, 302.714¼ 39.021, p< 0.01)
and Friedman test, c2¼ 244.379, p< 0.01. Therefore, the null hypothesis (H5) is rejected. Professional accounting bodies,
European accounting standard-setters, auditors and the FASB are perceived to be by far the most inﬂuential groups in the
process. On a scale of 1–5, where 1was ‘very inﬂuential’ and 5 ‘not at all inﬂuential’, these groups elicited amean score of 1.66,
1.67, 1.75 and 1.76 respectively. In addition, at least 80% of the respondents gave a score of 1 or 2 to each of these groups, e.g.,
87% gave such a score to auditing ﬁrms.
Of the remaining groups, the most inﬂuential were considered to be the SEC and the European Governments (including
the European Commission), which elicited very similar average scores: 2.31 and 2.33 respectively. Preparers were the group
which elicited the next highest average score, i.e., 2.72. Overall, however, preparers were clearly considered signiﬁcantly less
inﬂuential than professional bodies/auditors and accounting standard-setters. This ﬁnding is not consistent with that of Kwok
and Sharp (2005), who determined that, in the promulgation of two standards by the IASC, the preparers had more inﬂuence
than other parties. It is likely that this inconsistency is due to the different nature of the two studies. Whilst this study is
concerned with perceptions of inﬂuence, Kwok and Sharp’s (2005) study was concerned with the actual effectiveness of the
various interest groups as inferred from an analysis of the content of lobbying. Another possibility is that the inﬂuence of
preparers has waned during the IASB period.
Table 7
Reasons for not participating in the IASB process.
1 Very
important
%
2 Important
%
3 Neither important
nor unimportant
%
4 Unimportant
%
5 Very
unimportant
%
Mean of
Likert score
SD of
Likert score
The cost (including time) of
participating in the IASB
standard-setting process (n¼ 64)
33 28 19 9 11 2.38 1.33
The belief that your ﬁrm’s
views were adequately represented
by other investment industry
representatives (n¼ 63)
27 27 21 10 16 2.60 1.40
Lack of sufﬁcient expertise to identify
the impact of the proposed
changes (n¼ 64)
11 20 28 22 19 3.17 1.27
The belief that the IASB would not have
responded positively to your
ﬁrm’s views (n¼ 63)
9 16 41 17 17 3.17 1.17
Lack of impact of the proposed changes
on the ability of your ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
analysts to analyse company ﬁnancial
statements (n¼ 64)
6 23 28 20 22 3.28 1.23
The belief that the IASB would in any case
have adopted your ﬁrm’s preferred
position (n¼ 63)
3 11 46 11 29 3.51 1.12
n: number of ﬁrms responding to this item.
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Of these groups, institutional investors (e.g., pension funds) were perceived to be the most inﬂuential, eliciting an average score
of 3.05, whilst stockbrokers were perceived to be the least inﬂuential (average score of 3.85). Fund management companies
were also perceived not to be especially inﬂuential (mean score of 3.48 with only 19% giving them a rating of 1 or 2). This
perception may explain the relatively low level of participation amongst these groups. An alternative interpretation is that
investment ﬁrms do not consider themselves to be inﬂuential because they are aware that their level of participation is lower
than that of other interest groups.10 Finally, academics were not considered particularly inﬂuential by the majority of
respondents (mean score of 3.13). This perception is consistent with that of US academics, who cited as one of the main reasons
against participation in the FASB process their low expectations of affecting FASB decisions (Tandy &Wilburn,1996). It contrasts,
however, the ﬁndings of McLeay, Ordelheide, and Young (2000), who reported that academic experts were actually inﬂuential
during the process of transforming the Fourth European Company Law Directive into German accounting law.
In summary, two main observations can be made. First, the respondents gave very similar ratings to parties which belong
to the same interest group. For example, the ratings given to professional accounting bodies and auditors, which both belong
to the accounting profession, were very similar, as were those given to regulatory bodies, i.e., the SEC and European
Governments (including the European Commission). It is signiﬁcant that the respondents did not consider the US SEC and
FASB to be more inﬂuential than their European counterparts. Therefore, at least during the period under study, concerns
about US dominance of the IASB process (De Lange & Howieson, 2006) are not shared by investment ﬁrms. It should be
emphasised, however, that these are UK ﬁnancial statement users and so, due to the alleged closeness of the UK to the US on
ﬁnancial reporting issues,11 they may not ‘feel’ any US dominance.
Second, it is clear that respondents considered the accounting profession and the accounting standard-setting bodies,
which arguably are heavily inﬂuenced by the accounting profession, to be the dominant groups in the standard-setting
process. This seems to be consistent with the ﬁndings of Durocher et al. (2007, p.53) that some users perceive accounting
standard-setting to be the task of accountants. In contrast, ﬁnancial statement user groups are not perceived as inﬂuential.
This should be of concern to the IASB, given that users of ﬁnancial statements are one of the target beneﬁciaries of its
standards. One of the explicit objectives of the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation (IASCF), which
oversees the work of the IASB is:10 It is
that the
11 For
G4þ1to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting
standards . .to help participants in the world’s capital markets and other users make economic decisions (IASCF, 2007,
para. 2).acknowledged that this response may, to an extent, be the result of ‘gaming’ on the part of respondents as they might have been reluctant to reveal
y were actually inﬂuential in the process.
example, up to 2001 the UK’s ASB, together with its US, Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand counterparts, were members of the inﬂuential
group.
Table 8
Perceived inﬂuence of interest groups (1 Very inﬂuential, 5 Not Inﬂuential at all).
1 Very
inﬂuential
%
2
%
3
%
4
%
5 Not Inﬂuential
at all
%
Mean of
Likert score
SD of Likert
score
Professional accountancy bodies (n¼ 64) 56 27 12 5 0 1.66 0.88
European accounting standard-setters
(e.g., the UK’s ASB) and EFRAG (n¼ 64)
50 36 11 3 0 1.67 0.80
Auditing ﬁrms (n¼ 64) 42 45 9 2 2 1.75 0.82
The USA’s Financial Accounting
Standards Board (n¼ 62)
47 34 16 3 0 1.76 0.84
The USA’s Securities and Exchange
Commission (n¼ 62)
24 35 31 5 5 2.31 1.05
European Governments (e.g., UK) and
the European Commission (n¼ 64)
19 42 30 6 3 2.33 0.96
Preparers of ﬁnancial statements (n¼ 64) 11 42 23 11 13 2.72 1.89
Institutional investors (e.g., pension funds,
mutual funds, insurance companies) (n¼ 63)
11 25 25 24 14 3.05 1.24
Academics (n¼ 61) 13 13 33 30 11 3.13 1.20
Fund management companies (n¼ 63) 3 16 29 35 17 3.48 1.06
Stockbrokers and other sell-side
institutions (n¼ 62)
2 10 27 24 37 3.85 1.08
n: number of ﬁrms responding to this item.
G. Georgiou / The British Accounting Review 42 (2010) 103–118 115Perceptions by report users that other interest groups are dominating the IASB’s decisionmaking process may be evidence
either that the IASB is not achieving this goal or, if it is, that it has notmanaged to convey this message to the user community.
Moreover, such perceptions fail to dispel criticism of private standard-setters that, in promulgating their standards, they cite
the interests of report users only as a rhetorical device (Young, 2003).
6. Conclusion
There has been a long-standing gap in the literature concerning the nature and volume of participation by ﬁnancial
statement users in the process of setting accounting standards. This paper makes a contribution towards ﬁlling this gap, as it
reports evidence relating to the perceptions and participation in the IASB process of a sample of UK investment management
ﬁrms. These ﬁrms, however, belong to a nation state which has the capacity for direct participation in the IASB process
(Standish, 2003) and caution should be exercised in generalising them to non-UK investment companies or to non-
respondent ﬁrms.
The ﬁndings of the study indicate that the level of lobbying activity undertaken by investment management ﬁrms
is, relative to that of other interest groups such as ﬁnancial statement preparers, low. This is a conﬁrmation of the
ﬁndings of studies which used comment letters as a proxy for this activity. The study’s ﬁndings are also consistent
with Georgiou’s (2004) that the use of comment letters is signiﬁcantly associated with the use of other lobbying
methods.
Importantly, however, the study also revealed that a substantial number of ﬁrms, instead of using comment letters, choose
to lobby through indirect means, notably by appealing to a report user representative organisation, such as the IMA. There are
two implications of this ﬁnding. First, that the participation of report users in the IASB process is not as low as suggested by
the number of comment letters submitted by this interest group. Second, that the IASB should paymore attention to the views
of report user organisations as these seem to be relied upon by a considerable number of ﬁrms to represent their interests.
Future research in this area is warranted to establish the extent, nature and inﬂuence of the lobbying activities of these
organisations.
Another signiﬁcant ﬁnding of the study relates to the reasons for not participating in the process. Most of the respondents
indicated that the most important reasons were the cost of lobbying and the belief that other users would represent their
interests. These ﬁndings are consistent with this study’s other ﬁnding: that lobbying through report user organisations is
popular, as these organisations, according to the theory of collective action, act as a means of cost-sharing (Lindahl, 1987;
Olson, 1965). It is also worth contrasting the ﬁnding concerning the importance of cost with the ﬁndings of other studies
which have shown that the preparers of ﬁnancial statements do not consider the cost of lobbying as a signiﬁcant reason for
not participating in the process (Georgiou, 2002).
Finally, it is noteworthy that the respondents to the questionnaire did not perceive any of the report user groups as
particularly inﬂuential in the IASB process. Consistent with this was the ﬁnding that non-participation on their part was not
prompted by a belief that the IASB would have adopted their preferred position in any case. By contrast, they considered the
accounting profession and the accounting standard-setting bodies (both the FASB and the European ones) to be the dominant
players in the IASB process. Such perceptions should be of concern to the IASB because, if they persist, they will eventually
lead to an erosion of its role as an independent standard-setting body. It should be emphasised that perceptions do not always
coincide with reality, and further research is needed to determine whether these perceptions are in fact correct. Moreover,
further research relating to the lobbying behaviour of investment management ﬁrms post-2006, as well as research involving
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ranted in order to establish the generalizability of the study’s other ﬁndings.
Appendix.
Questionnaire instrument
The IASB standard-setting process includes a number of stages through which a proposal passes before it is adopted as an
international ﬁnancial reporting standard (IFRS). For example, an issue has to be ﬁrst admitted on the IASB’s agenda. A ﬁrm
may participate in the process in a variety of ways (e.g., directly by communicating its views to the IASB, or indirectly by
communicating its views to other parties, such as its trade association).
Questions 1 and 2 relate to the stages at which, and themethods by which a ﬁrm may participate in the IASB standard-
setting process. As appropriate, please tick Yes or No, and then tick the number on the effectiveness scale which best
represents your opinion. Use the scale:
1[Very effective 2[ Effective 3[Neither effective nor ineffective 4[ Ineffective 5[Very ineffective DK[Don’t
know
1. For each of the following stages of the IASB standard-setting process, please indicate:
(i) whether your ﬁrm has participated at these stages over the period 2001 to 2006 inclusive; and
(ii) regardless of whether your ﬁrm has actually participated at these stages, how you rate participation at each stage in
terms of effectiveness (i.e., having an effect on the ﬁnal outcome of the process)?Stage of the standard-setting process Actual use Effectiveness scale
Yes No 1 2 3 4 5 DK
Agenda formation stage
Drafting stage of discussion paper
Exposure period of discussion paper
Drafting stage of exposure draft
Exposure period of exposure draft
Drafting stage of IFRS2. For each of the following methods of participating in the IASB standard-setting process, please indicate:
(i) whether your ﬁrm has used these methods over the period 2001 to 2006 inclusive; and
(ii) regardless of whether your ﬁrm has actually used these methods, how you rate each method in terms of effectiveness
(i.e., having an effect on the ﬁnal outcome of the process)?Method of participation Actual use Effectiveness scale
Yes No 1 2 3 4 5 DK
Submitting comment letters in response to
IASB’s invitations to comment
Speaking at IASB public hearings
Participating in IASB public round-table
meetings
Participating in ﬁeld visits and/or ﬁeld tests
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB
members in pre-arranged private meetings
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB
members through other means
(e.g., telephone conversation, meeting at
conferences)
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB
technical staff in pre-arranged private
meetings
Communicating your ﬁrm’s views to IASB
technical staff through other means
(e.g., telephone conversation, meeting
at conferences)
Commenting in the media
(continued)
Method of participation Actual use Effectiveness scale
Yes No 1 2 3 4 5 DK
Appealing to UK government and/or European
Commission ofﬁcials for support of your
ﬁrm’s views
Appealing to the members or technical staff of
the UK’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB)
or of the European Financial Reporting
Advisory Group (EFRAG) for support of your
ﬁrm’s views
Appealing to your ﬁrm’s trade association(s)
(such as the Investment Management
Association) for support of your ﬁrm’s views
and/or participating in the preparation of its
response
Having employees of your ﬁrm appointed as
members to advisory/working groups set up
by IASB for particular projects
Sponsoring research studies on ﬁnancial
accounting and reporting issues
Other (please specify)
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setting process, how important were the following factors in your ﬁrm’s decision(s) not to participate? Use the scale:
1[Very important 2[ Important 3[Neither important nor unimportant 4[Unimportant 5[Very unimportantLack of sufﬁcient expertise to identify the impact of the proposed changes
Lack of impact of the proposed changes on the ability of your ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial analysts to analyse company ﬁnancial statements
The belief that the IASB would not have responded positively to your ﬁrm’s views
The belief that the IASB would in any case have adopted your ﬁrm’s preferred position
The belief that your ﬁrm’s views were adequately represented by other investment industry representatives
The cost (including time) of participating in the IASB standard-setting process
Other (please specify)4. How inﬂuential do you consider the following interest groups to be in the IASB standard-setting process?
Use a scale of 1–5 where 1[ ‘Very inﬂuential’ and 5[ ‘Not at all inﬂuential’Institutional investors (e.g., pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies)
Fund management companies
Stockbrokers and other sell-side institutions
Preparers of ﬁnancial statements
Auditing ﬁrms
Professional accountancy bodies
European accounting standard-setters (e.g., the UK’s ASB) and EFRAG
The USA’s Financial Accounting Standards Board
European Governments (e.g., UK) and the European Commission
The USA’s Securities and Exchange Commission
Academics
Other (please specify)5. If you have any additional comments to make please use the space provided below.References
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